Resumo Frequentemente, presume-se que o sistema de freios e contrapesos é efetivo para conter a corrupção, em parte porque ele é tipicamente entendido como sinônimo de separação de poderes. Argumentamos que o sistema de freios e contrapesos é apenas uma das várias possíveis manifestações da separação de poderes. Sugerimos que a aparente correlação entre freios e contrapesos e o controle da corrupção decorre de condições antecedentes a ambos. Utilizando exemplos de democracias ocidentais, demonstramos que o conceito de freios e contrapesos é em si mesmo vazio, e somente é efetivado por fatores “duros”, como o equilíbrio das forças políticas, e por fatores “brandos”, como a aderência de elites a normas de comportamento. Isso não significa que ele não possa ser um instrumento útil, mas que nossos pressupostos a respeito de sua utilidade talvez estejam mal informados: a relação com o controle da corrupção é, no melhor dos casos, indireta.

Abstract It is often assumed that checks and balances are effective in curbing corruption, in part because checks and balances are so often assumed to be synonymous with the separation of powers. We argue that checks and balances are only one of several potential manifestations of the separation of powers. We suggest that the apparent correlation between checks and balances and control of corruption is driven by a variety of conditions antecedent to both. Using examples from Western democracies, we demonstrate that the concept of checks and balances is by itself an empty vessel, made effective only by “hard” factors such as the balance of political forces and “soft” factors such as the adherence of elites to particular behavioral norms. This does not mean that checks and balances cannot be useful, but rather that our assumptions about their precise utility may be misinformed: the relationship between checks and balances and curbing corruption is at best indirect.

This article discusses the role of the Judiciary in public policymaking. The first part of the text summarizes the importance of integrating the courts better into our analyses of public policymaking and policy implementation in the Brazilian political system. The second part discusses the main factors influencing the degree and depth of the Judiciary's impact on public policies.

Dans cet article, on discute le rôle du pouvoir judiciaire dans la formulation de politiques publiques. Dans sa première partie, on montre l'importance de mettre en place une meilleure intégration des tribunaux à nos analyses du processus de formulation et d'implantation de politiques publiques dans le système politique brésilien. Dans la seconde, on juge les principaux facteurs qui influent sur le degré et la profondeur de l'impact du pouvoir judiciaire dans les politiques publiques.

The article analyzes the judicialization patterns in politics during the two terms of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and compare them to the subsequent period of slightly less than a term and a half under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2008). The purpose of the comparison was to observe whether appeals were issued to the Supreme Court challenging Federal acts on grounds of unconstitutionality. Both differences were observed and some common uses of judicialization when comparing the two Presidential Administrations.

Dans cet article, on examine les modèles de recours en appel à la Cour Suprême de Justice employés par les hommes politiques pendant les deux mandats du président Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) et on les compare à la période suivante concernant le mandat et demi du président Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2008). On cherche à savoir si l'on trouve des différences dans la façon de faire appel à la Cour Suprême de Justice pour la contestation d'actes du pouvoir fédéral par le moyen de l'Action Directe d'Inconstitutionnalité. On a trouvé, à ce sujet, entre les deux gouvernements, des disparités mais aussi certains usages communs.

This article discusses the role of the Judiciary in public policymaking. The first part of the text summarizes the importance of integrating the courts better into our analyses of public policymaking and policy implementation in the Brazilian political system. The second part discusses the main factors influencing the degree and depth of the Judiciary's impact on public policies.

Dans cet article, on discute le rôle du pouvoir judiciaire dans la formulation de politiques publiques. Dans sa première partie, on montre l'importance de mettre en place une meilleure intégration des tribunaux à nos analyses du processus de formulation et d'implantation de politiques publiques dans le système politique brésilien. Dans la seconde, on juge les principaux facteurs qui influent sur le degré et la profondeur de l'impact du pouvoir judiciaire dans les politiques publiques.

The Brazilian federal judiciary offers an interesting riddle to scholars of judicial politics and policy change. While the courts have played a major policy role over the past two decades, constraining and altering federal policy across a range of subjects, the court system has simultaneously been labeled "dysfunctional." This paper investigates this riddle: a system plagued by major systemic flaws in its day-to-day operations, which nonetheless still manages to exert a powerful influence on public policy in Brazil. I adopt a new institutional perspective, focusing on how the institutional and normative structure within which judges and other legal actors operate affects policy outcomes.